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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICK M. VRONTIKIS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DOROTHY MAE JENSON 
VRONTIKIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9252 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
The plaintiff respondent does not agree with defendant 
appellant's staten1ent of facts because it contains arguments, 
conclusions, innuendos and matters not in issue. 
With the court's indulgence, plaintiff respondent states 
the facts to be as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action for a divorce commenced by the plaintiff. 
The parties were married October 30, 1952. There were no 
children born as an issue (R. 4). 
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The case was tried on the issues as presented by the 
plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 20), and defendant's 
answer and counter claim (R. 34), the court having on motion 
of the defendant set aside the antenuptial agreement which 
formed a part of plaintiff's amended complaint. 
The court heard the matter, which lasted two days and 
made its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 86), and 
based on the findings made its decree awarding the plaintiff 
respondent a divorce and dismissed defendant's counter-
claim (R. 94-125). 
The court found that the plaintiff earned a salary in the 
sum of $450.00 per month before deductions, and that the 
parties to the proceedings acquired an equity in a home 
amounting to $9,500.00, some furniture and furnishings and 
appliances ( R. 86-8; R. 90) . 
That the plaintiff was the owner of 10,000 shares of stock 
in the Vrontikis Brothers, Inc., valued at $1,000.00; and a 
promissory note issued by V rontikis Brothers, Inc., in 1954 
in the amount of $10,000.00, which was pledged to First 
Security Bank by the corporation in order to enable the cor-
poration to sustain credit by borrowing; and several issues of 
uranium stocks of no value (R. 121). 
The court awarded the defendant appellant $3,000.00 
property settlement, $150.00 support and alimony for one 
year, household furniture and appliances and $1,000.00 attor-
neys fees and costs (R. 125). The court further ordered the 
plaintiff to pay and discharge all medical expenses such as 
doctor fees and hospital expenses incurred to date by the 
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defendant; that all the rest and remainder of the property 
belonging to the parties was awarded to the plaintiff (R. 125-6). 
Plaintiff appellant sold the equity which the parties had 
to the property described in the decree for the sum of 
$10,000.00 (R. 177). That plaintiff, after the sale of the equity, 
deposited with the Clerk of Court the sum of $4,006.80; 
$3,006.80 payment to defendant appellant as by order of court 
and $1,000.00 for the use and benefit of her attorneys (R. 155). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING 
CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF THE PLAINTIFF ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO LAY ANY 
FOUNDATION FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 
TESTIMONY. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL AS NO SUBSTANTIAL 
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN EFFECTED 
BY ANY RULING OF THE COURT. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS A RESIDEN_,T OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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FOR MORE THAN THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS THE OWNER OF STOCK OF GUNSITE BUTTE 
URANIUM CORPORATION. 
POINT V. 
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT BONUS PAY-
MENTS TO PLAINTIFF BY VRONTIKIS BROTHERS 
CORPORATION WERE DIVIDENDS IS NOT BASED 
UPON FACT, LAW, OR REASON. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WILL NOT BE DIS-
TURBED ON APPEAL UNLESS A CLEAR ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION IS SHOWN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING 
CERTAIN TESTIMONY OF THE PLAINTIFF ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO LAY ANY 
FOUNDATION FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 
TESTIMONY. 
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In Point One of defendant's brief, she sets forth certain 
excerpts from the transcript relative to certain alleged conduct 
of the plaintif-f. Defendant has seen fit to omit from her brief 
other testimony relating to this same issue. The following is the 
record: 
Q. (By Mr. Gee) (!When were you out of the country this 
last year? 
A. (Mr. V rontikis) February. 
Q. February 1959? 
A. Yes. 
* * * * 
Q. Who accompanied you to Mexico? 
MR. N. J. COTRO-MANES: I object to all this cross 
examination as improper, not proper cross examination and 
on the further ground that there is nothing in the pleadings 
to substantiate this. 
THE COURT: Well, this is an equitable proceedings. 
I suppose counsel seeks to show by cross examination that the 
plaintiff is not in a blameless position, and that plaintiff is 
not one that should receive equity at the hands of the court. 
11R. N. J. COTRO-MANES: Where would the equity 
come in if he took a trip? 
MR. PAUL COTRO-MANES: Further, this February ts 
after filing of the complaint for divorce. 
THE COURT: Is that right? 
MR. GEE: That is right, Your Honor. 
9 
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THE COURT: I don't think it is material then. 
MR. GEE: It would be material if we could show the 
course of action preceding it. 
THE COURT: If you could show something preceding it? 
MR. GEE: Yes. 
THE COURT: You should begin by showing prior events, 
and it might be that the circumstances after would have a 
bearing with respect to credibility. 
MR. GEE: It might also go to credibility, it would develop 
a problem. 
THE COURT: The rules with regard to the test of credi-
bility, it seems to the court in this instance, don't justify its 
receipt, and the objection is sustained" (R. 210-11). 
The defendant took the stand and testified to certain 
acts of the plaintiff which caused her mental distress in support 
of her counter-claim ground for divorce of Mental Cruelty. 
It is important to note that this is the only ground upon which 
she predicated her claim for an award of the divorce to herself. 
She did not amend her pleadings to come in any of the other 
grounds as allowed by the Utah Statutes. In reading over her 
testimony, it is to be noted that she did not once mention any 
conduct of the plaintiff which caused her any mental or 
physical suffering after October, 1958. How then, is anything 
that occurred after October, 1958 grounds for divorce? 
The examination of the plaintiff by counsel for the de-
fendant was for the purpose of proving the grounds for divorce 
as set forth by the defendant herself. As she based her claim 
10 
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upon mental cruelty, conduct which had no effect upon her 
mental or physical being were not grounds for divorce as 
pleaded in her counter-claim. 
If the defendant wanted to go into matters which were 
not pleaded in her counter-claim, she had the affirmative 
duty to amend her pleadings. This was not done. To allow the 
defendant to go outside of her pleadings in an attempt to 
prove grounds for divorce other than those pleaded would 
be to place the plaintiff in the position of having no notice 
upon which he could predicate a defense. 
The court recently observed: 
"Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate 
technicalities and liberalize procedure, we must not lose 
sight of the cardinal principle that under our system 
of justice, if an issue is to be tried and a party's rights 
concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice 
thereof and an opportunity to meet it." 
Buehner Block Co. v. Gelzos, 6 U.2d 226, 310 
P.2d 517 quoting the case of National Farm-
ers Union v. Thompson, 4 U.2d 7, 286 P.2d 
249. 
Rule 8 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that 
the complaint or counter-claim shall contain a statement of 
the claim upon which the party seeks recovery. 
This Court, in the case of Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 U.2d 
157, 280 P.2d 453, holds that the complaint is required to 
give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis 
or grounds of the claim. 
Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nAmend-
ments to conform to the Evidence," provides: 
11 
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nWhen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings." 
It is apparent from the strong objections made by plaintiff 
when the defendant sought to examine plaintiff as to a trip 
to Mexico, and defendant's counsel having stated that he 
sought to show uinfidelity" and that nplaintiff was stepping 
out on defendant," that there was no consent by plaintiff, 
either express or implied, to the trial of this issue. 
The record discloses that the defendant did not at any 
time move the court for leave to amend her pleadings to raise 
the issue of adultery, although Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure allows liberal amendments. Wells v. Wells, 
2 U.2d 241, 272 P.2d 167. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of Mitchell v. 
Palmer, 121 U. 245, 240 P.2d 970, held that an objection on 
the grounds of immateriality and irrelevancy to the introduction 
of grounds not pleaded in the complaint was proper, and that 
if the other side did not move for leave to amend as provided 
by Rule 15 (b), he could not properly pursue those grounds. 
The court sustained the objection to the introduction of 
the plaintiff's activities after the filing of the complaint on the 
grounds of immateriality (R. 210) and the following day in 
referring back to its previous ruling again refused to allow 
any evidence of events not complained about by the defendant 
or which occurred after the filing of the plaintiff's complaint. 
The Court, in discussing the defendant's objections to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, asked defendant's 
12 
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counsel to show the court any instance where the defendant, 
herself, had complained of the conduct of the plaintiff during 
the months of January or February, 1959. Counsel could not 
do this as there '\vas nothing in the record to show that the 
defendant had suffered by reason of the conduct of the plaintiff 
during this period. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL AS NO SUBSTANTIAL 
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN EFFECTED 
BY ANY RULING OF THE COURT. 
The defendant had her day in court. She now seeks an-
other day. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
ccNo error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or 
order in anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing the judgment order, unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." 
As pointed out previously the grounds for divorce as 
plead by the defendant was based upon (Cmental cruelty." Not 
adultery or any other grounds as specified by 30-3-1, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943 as amended. She made no complaint 
about any conduct of the defendant after October, 1958. 
13 
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How then, can she complain about a substantial right 
being affected by the exclusion of evidence, even if proper, 
which woudl not be and could not be the basis of granting a 
divorce in her favor? 
The burden is upon the defendant to show that the refusal 
of the court to admit the introduction of the evidence was 
prejudicial. Burton v. ZCMI, 122 U. 360, 249 P.2d 514. 
To what extent was the defendant prejudiced by having 
the record shortened by limiting the examination on this 
subject? The record shows that the plaintiff under cross-
examination denied any and all associations with other women 
for a period of two years immediately prior to the filing of 
the complaint by the plaintiff (R. 209-210). What further 
benefit could the defendant have derived from further denials 
by the plaintiff? The defendant did not offer to put on any 
other witness, other than the plaintiff himself, to show mis-
conduct on his part, and then the defendant did not complain 
of any actions of his during the time that counsel for defendant 
sought to go into. 
Defendant, in an attempt to get her ((other day in court" 
now seeks to use the trial court's refusal to go into events, 
not complained about by the defendant, as a means of obtaining 
a new trial, by charging error. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has set forth the basis upon 
which a trial court may grant a new trial. 
In the case of Startin v. Madsen, 120 U. 631, 237 P.2d 834, 
the Court said: 
((We must keep uppermost in mind the provtston 
of our statute. See 104-14-7, UCA, 1943. The Court 
14 
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must * * * disregard any error * * * which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties and no judg-
ment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such 
error or defect. See Rule 61, U.R.C.P., to the same 
effect. Before the appellant is entitled to previa!, he 
must show both error and prejudice; that is, that his 
substantial rights are affected, and that there is at least 
a fair likelihood that the result would have been 
different. (Citing cases). Even if incompetent evidence 
is admitted, unless it is harmful to defendant, it is not 
grounds for reversal." (Citing cases) . 
The much cited case of Crellin v. Thomas, 122 U. 122, 
247 P.2d 264, in discussing the granting of a new trial on the 
grounds of newly discovered exidence, held: 
(C * * * the exercise of judicial discretion in such 
instance must be based on a showing of substantial 
material evidence, from which it appears there is at 
least a reasonable likelihood that it would affect the 
result of a new trial." (Emphasis ours). 
See also Uptown Appliance v. Flint, 123 U. 153, 249 P.2d 
826, to the same effect. 
Even if there has been error tn excluding the evidence, 
the court should not grant a new trial as to the facts, if the 
court was satisfied with the facts, but merely allow the issue 
of the law to be retried. Tebbs & Tebbs v. Oliveto, 123 U. 153, 
256 P.2d 699. In the case now before the court, the trial court 
was satisfied with the facts of the case and therefore the only 
question would be one of law, and there was no question of 
law involved, as the defendant had failed and refused to 
amend her pleadings to allege any ground for divorce which, 
in light of the evidence adduced, would have been basis for 
awarding the defendant the divorce. 
15 
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The appellant cites many cases with regard to the intro-
duction of evidence of grounds for divorce which occurred 
after the filing of plaintiff's complaint and before the filing 
of defendant's counter-claim. It is submitted that this is 
proper, and the trial court should permit the introduction 
which would go to prove the allegations of the defendant's 
counter-claim, however the evidence sought to be introduced 
must go to the proof of those allegations. The Supreme Court 
of Tennessee, (Schwalb v. Schwalb, 282 SW, 2d 661, 1955), 
held that matters may be considered by the court which occurred 
after the filing of the divorce action, if incorporated into the 
action by amendment or supplemental bill. 
The Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Raymond 
v. Raymond ( 1957), 132 A.2d 427, held that the events 
occurring after the filing of the complaint must be incorporated 
into the action by amendment of pleadings. The court stated 
further that it is a prerequisite that the other party be appraised 
of the grounds upon which the party asserting the later events 
is relying, and that if the other party is not appraised, by 
amendment or its equivalent, the introduction of evidence 
of such later events is objectionable. 
The defendant sought to show infidelity, but did not 
plead this as a grounds for divorce, nor did she testify as to 
any infidelity of the plaintiff, nor did she testify as to any 
suffering because of the actions of the plaintiff after October, 
1958. What then, is the prejudice to the plaintiff? As pointed 
out before, plaintiff denied any infidelity on cross-examination 
by defendant's counsel (R. 209-210). 
Defendant attempts in her brief to make something out 
16 
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of the form of the objection made by plaintiffs counsel. De-
fendant ignores the court's ruling made the previous day on 
the same issue ( R. 211) and ignores the fact that the court 
referred back to its previous ruling. The objection made on 
one ground was that the matter was not within the plead-
ings (R. 210). 
Rule 15 (b) provides: 
" * * * If evidence is objected to at the trial on. the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails ot satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defendant upon the merits." 
Again it is pointed out that defendant did not seek to 
enlarge the grounds upon which she sought a divorce. As to 
credibility, the record shows the statements of the plaintiff. 
Defendant offered no proof, either through her own statements 
or through the testimony of other witnesses to question the 
credibility of the plaintiff. How then could this line of ques-
tioning attack the credibility of the plaintiff ? 
Defendant's counsel was specifically asked by the court 
the basis for his questioning the plaintiff about his whereabouts 
in February, 1959, and counsel admitted that it was to show 
infidelity, thereupon the court made the same ruling as it had 
on the previous day, and sustained plaintiff's objections to the 
line of questioning. 
The law is clear that in a divorce action, the court may 
grant a divorce only upon the grounds as alleged in the com-
17 
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plaint or counter-claim. As stated in the Alabama case of 
Rudicell v. Rudicell ( 1955) 77 So.2d 339: 
((While evidence tending to show acts of illicit sexual 
intercourse between defendant and others subsequent 
to the filing of the bill was admissible when o If ered 
in connection with or subsequent to the introduction 
of evidence tending to show adulterous intercourse 
between the pa'f'ties during the time covered by the 
averments of t.he bill, the right to relief must rest upon 
proof of the adulterous intercourse charged in the 
bill." (Emphasis ours). 
See also Renner v. Renner (1940) Maryland, 12 A.2d 195, 
127 A.L.R. 674; Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 100 Am Dec 
110; Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 U. 178, 257 P.2d 366; 
Gilmore v. Gilmore, ____ Cal. ____ , 287 P.2d 769. 
This Court has ruled that recrimination in a divorce action 
has been discarded. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 U. 178, 257 
P.2d 366; Curry v. Curry, 7 U.2d 198, 321 P.2d 939; Griffeths 
v. Griffeths, 3 U.2d 82, 278 P.2d 983. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court has gone into the historical background and 
has ruled that it had no basis in modern divorce law. Pavletich 
v. Payletich, ____ NM ____ , 174 P.2d 826. In that case the trial 
court announced: 
nAt this time I may as well state that I do not intend 
to make a finding of adultery, because I do not believe 
that adultery existing after a separation and state of 
incompatibility, with the parties living separate and 
apart, is material to the decision of the court in grant-
ing a divorce * * * . " 
This was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which ruled 
18 
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"The trial Court, therefore, correctly ruled that the 
question of adultery of appellant (Plaintiff, husband) 
was immaterial." 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS A RESIDENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
FOR MORE THAN THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION. 
The defendant's contention under Point III of her brief 
may be likened to that of a drowning man reaching for a 
straw to support himself upon. 
It is interesting to note that defendant admitted in her 
answer dated February 10, 1959, that the plaintiff was a 
resident of Salt Lake County and had been for more than 
three months prior to filing the action. (See Answer and 
Amended Answer) . 
It is also interesting to note that the defendant did not 
request the court to amend its Findings of Fact with regard 
to this fact. 
The record abounds with evidence and testimony of both 
plaintiff (R. 145) and defendant as to the fact that the 
plaintiff was engaged in business in Salt Lake City and had 
been since 1952, that the plaintiff and defendant lived on 
State Street from 1952 until 1957, when they moved to Country 
Club Drive where they lived until the time of the filing of 
the divorce in 1959. The residency of the plaintiff in Salt 
Lake County since 1952 was established beyond any doubt 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the trial court so found. Where there are facts upon 
which the trial court could base its findings the appellate 
court will not disturb those findings. The law and cases have 
established this beyond the necessity of citing authority. 
POIN~f IV. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS THE OWNER OF STOCK OF GUNSITE BUTTE 
URANIUM CORPORATION. 
Defendant, in her brief, for the first time, raises a point 
that the plaintiff was the owner of 36,000 shares of stock of 
Gunsite Butte Uranium Corporation, valued at $1,080.00. 
Defendant did not request the trial court to make a finding 
that the plaintiff was the owner of this stock, but raises this 
issue for the first time upon appeal. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 2 show that the stock 
was purchased by check by Vrontikis Brothers Company, and 
Mr. Vrontikis testified that the only reason that the stock was 
issued in his name was that, upon advice of Mr. Kane of 
Hogle's, it would be easier to have it in the name of an indi-
vidual instead of in the name of a corporation (R. 184). 
The owner of the stock was V rontikis Brothers, Incorporated 
(R. 184). This evidence was not disputed. 
POINT V. 
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT BONUS PAY-
MENTS TO PLAINTIFF BY VRONTIKIS BROTHERS 
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CORPORATION WERE DIVIDENDS IS NOT BASED 
UPON FACT, LAW, OR REASON. 
Defendant in Point IV of her brief alleges that the 
payment of bonuses to the plaintiff were dividend payments 
by the corporation. Defendant did not submit any evidence to 
substantiate this, such as corporate records or books, but merely 
makes statements not founded on facts, law or common usage 
of words. 
The plaintiff testified that, 
nin our work for over seven years we worked seven 
days a week, eight hours work is routine for most 
people. I put in more hours than most people do. I 
have a lot of work to do. I might be unloading, I 
might be loading, I might be making out contracts, 
I might be selling~ making advertising, I might be 
doing one of a dozen functions and for that and for 
those services if the corporation thinks it is worth 
their while they will give me a bonus." (R. 289). 
A bonus is not a dividend. A bonus paid by a corporation 
is not a gift or gratuity, but a sum paid for services or on a 
consideration or in addition to that which ordinarily be given. 
Diamond v. Davis, 38 NYS.2d 103, 113; Adams v. Mid-
West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147; Lakos 
v. Saliaris, CCA Md. 116 F.2d 440, 442; Payne v. United 
States, 269 F. 871. 
The term udividend," as applied to corporations in a 
legal sense and as generally understood in common usage, 
means earnings or profits which are distributed in proportion 
to the shares of stock in the cruporation owned by the several 
stockholders. In Re Romney's Estate, 60 U. 173, 207 P. 139. 
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The record does not disclose that all stockholders of 
the corporation received bonuses, and even if they had, the 
record does not disclose what work they did to receive them. 
Defendant complains that the court refused to order the 
plaintiff to answer certain interrogatories and thereby she 
was prejudiced. Had she proceeded, by use of Rule 26, 31 
and 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, she could have obtained 
this informaiton from the Corporation. 
Defendant could have, through diligence, ascertained 
all that she now seeks to claim prejudice for not having 
ascertained. She charges the court with error in finding the 
value of the V rontikis Brothers, Incorporated, stock to be 1 Oc 
per share, but she did not put on any evidence to rebutt the 
testimony and evidence of plaintiff whatsoever. 
Defendant asserts that par value of the stock of the 
corporation fixes the value of the stock. 
ct * * * a statement of par value, in shares, has little 
or no real significance.'' 
11 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, 
Perm Ed 185, Sect 5125. 
teA Court judicially knows that the par value of stock 
is very often in excess of its actual cash or market 
value." 
I. 0. Painter Fertilizer Co. v. Foss 
107 Fla, 464, 145 So 253 
Mr. Justice Stone of the Supreme Court of the United 
States summarized this argument by stating: 
((Par value and actual value of issued stock are not 
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synonymous, and there is often a wide disparity be-
tween them." 
People v. Latrobe 
279 U.S. 421, 73 L.Ed 776, 49 S. Ct. 377 
65 ALR 1341, 1346 
The value of the stock is 
"constantly in a state of fluctuation as the business 
prospers or declines.'' 
13 Am Jur 302, Corporations, Sec 177. 
Therefore the court must rely upon the evidence of the 
value of the stock. That value, which was uncontroverted by 
defendant, was 1 Oc per share, or a total to plaintiff, provided 
a buyer could be obtained, of $1,000.00. 
All of defendants cited atuhority admits that where there 
is evidence of the value of the stock, the par value has no 
significance. There \Vas evidence as to the value and this 
evidence was not challenged. Had defendant wished to 
challenge the evidence she had the means, through proper 
usage of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to do so. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WILL NOT BE DIS-· 
TURBED ON APPEAL UNLESS A CLEAR ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION IS SHOWN. 
The law is clear and well settled that the trial court has 
discretion to award such alimony as it sees fit and its decision 
will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of 
abuse. Blair v. Blair, 40 U. 306, 121 P. 19; Bullen v. Bullen, 
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71 U. 63, 262 P. 292; Friedli v. Friedli, 65 U. 605, 238 P. 
647; Lawlor v. Lawlor, 121 U. 201, 240 P.2d 271; Pfaff v. 
Pfaff, 121 U. 277, 241 P.2d 156. 
SUMMARY 
We submit that the judgment of the court below awarding 
plaintiff respondent a divorce and the settlement of property 
and alimony to the defendant appellant is just and proper under 
the evidence and that the findings of the court and its decree 
which is based upon substantial evidence was correct and as 
a matter of law the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CO'IRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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